This is not the first occasion of a transition from one theoretician to another.
Pashukanis himself had risen to prominence on criticism of the ideas of Professor Eugene A. Korovine, whose books 1 had made him the accepted theoretician of the first decade of the revolution. After Pashukanis began his criticism, Korovine gradually recanted over a period of years, but not until 1935 did he fully acknowledge his errors and adopt the new principles which had partly replaced his own ideas.2
The repudiation of Pashukanis has been of a more violent and sudden sort, covering but a few months and resulting in the complete annihilation of his ideas as not alone harmful but as the ideas of the enemy. The field has been cleared for an entirely new interpretation. Critics have counseled against a return to Korovine's earlier explanations as not fitting the needs of the day.
To be sure, some of Korovine's ideas which Pashukanis had denounced now seem to have been more nearly correct than the principles propounded by his critic, but writers demand a reworking of the whole subject. Only months after the first attacks on Pashukanis appeared did material begin to find its way into print hinting at an interpretation which jurists may now be willing to accept.3 When read in the light of previous theories these articles provide a suggestion as to the future progress of Soviet theoretical work in the sphere of international law.
No theory in this field can be termed an official one, for each represents only 1 Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo Perekhodnogo Vremeni (Moskva, 1924) [International Law of the Transition Period]; and Sovremennoe Mezhdunarodnoe Publichnoe Pravo (Moskva, 1926) [Contemporary International Public Law] .
2 See letter of May 5, 1935 , Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo (1935 See II Entsiklopediya Gosudarstva i Prava (Moskva, 1929 (Moskva, -1930 , p. 857.
Op. cit., supra, note 5. retrogressed, for although some slight mention of the purpose of international law as a means of ruling the proletariat appeared in his first definition, he left out all mention of it in the second. Here it is pointed out that he made a great mistake, and critics castigate him for failure to show that the struggle of capitalist states, although having the outward manifestations of a division of profits and territory, is certainly not carried on with that as its ultimate aim. Territory and profits would not be desired unless they performed some function and satisfied some need, and he is criticized for failing to show the underlying reasons for this fight for colonies. Explanation should have made clear that these struggles are the result of the crying need faced by every capitalist state to increase production, reduce costs, and satisfy the demands of its people, who are constantly being pauperized by a system which is no longer capable of meeting their needs. He failed to emphasize Lenin's teaching that foreign policy cannot be separated from internal policy,10 and that international law as practiced by capitalist states in their relations among themselves is directed towards a consolidation of the ruling position of capital.
New definitions will not be accepted unless they can cover the whole field and show the link between exploitation of the worker, the growing mass discontent, and the consequent search for new territory and new profitable relationships which may facilitate temporarily the dulling of this discontent by the satisfaction of popular needs at home through the exploitation of weaker and colonial peoples abroad. International law must be defined as class law in terms so simple and expressive that no one could possibly be deceived.1'
The Soviet press has long rung with revelations of this character. Every Soviet reader knows of the conflict of British and Japanese interests in India and China, both states seeking colonial markets to make possible continued employment and lower cost mass production. Soviet readers find these explanations supported by Japan's military advance into China where her conflict with other imperialist Powers, long waged by peaceful tools of international law, at last broke out into the open so that all could see its nature. Soviet economists have linked these military moves with Japan's deteriorating internal economy bringing with it the increasing discontent and unrest of the masses. The Soviet reader finds simple proof of the theoretician's argument that foreign policy is shaped to fit the demands of the struggle between the classes, and that international law as the tool of that policy is no more than a reflection of class conflicts calling for some attempts at solution.
In considering the next step, and treating of international law as used not between capitalist states alone, but by the Soviet Union in its relations with the imperialist world, Pashukanis set forth a definition which is now the butt of criticism. In the Encyclopedia 12 he called the law used in these relationships a temporary compromise between two antagonistic class systems-a compromise concluded when the bourgeois system can no longer secure for itself absolute control and the proletarian-socialist system has not yet conquered the field. For him it was a law between classes, and as such he thought that it might be termed a law of the transition period. Here he was treading perilously close to a law above class and having a palliative effect upon the class struggle. He is criticized because this definition concealed the class nature of law. He saw the error himself, for in his later publications he repudiated the first theory by saying that international law as used in the relations between the Soviet Union and imperialist states was not a compromise but one of the forms in which the struggle between the two systems flows along.13 He saw it as a struggle between two different and opposed economic and social systems, and as reflecting the basic fact that the whole world is breaking into two camps, capitalist and socialist. Now he is criticized because he merely stated the conflict as between systems and did not declare in unmistakable terms the class aims distinguishing these systems.'4 Any definition in the future must contain an explanation of the contrasting basic class interests which international law is serving in the soviet socialist state and in the imperialist capitalist states or it will not meet the demands of today's critics.
Soviet writers find a wealth of illustrative material on this point in the Spanish conflict. Every Soviet reader knows of the maneuvers within the League of Nations, led, on the one hand, by Italy and her bloc supporting the landlord, Church, and wealthy bourgeois elements, and, on the other hand, by the Soviet Union supporting the democratic groups-the worker, peasant, petty bourgeois and intellectual elements. Both sides rested their actions on alleged principles of international law, but writers find the basic contrasting class interests so near the surface that their influence upon the use of international law norms is apparent. Soviet readers have little trouble in drawing the conclusion that international law is being used to further class aims, and from that point the step is short to call it in substance class law.
Any writer cannot limit his explanation to the importance of class interests in the formulation of international law as used in these relationships between the Soviet Union and other states. He must go further and show how these class interests have developed so far within recent years as to bring about a change in the substance of international law as used by imperialist 12 See op. cit., p. 862, supra, note 6. 13 See op. cit., p. 17, supra, note 5. 14 See Taracouzio, op. cit., p. 3, supra, note 5. The author does not, however, analyz facts supporting the Marxian contention that before the proletarian revolution all states were slaveholding, feudal, or bourgeois dictatorships. Marxian authors will be required to make this analysis before they will now be accepted for Soviet students. He thought that in many cases one and the same form might be used with different class aims, and for different class purposes.'7
Korovine had previously pointed to the innovations practiced by the Soviet Union in her international relations-to the refusal to recognize capitulations and extraterritoriality in Turkey, Persia, Egypt and the Far East, to the reclassification of ambassadors and ministers as equally ranking representatives of the Soviet Union, to the creation of the trade delegation demanding rights of diplomatic immunity, to the advocacy of complete and general disarmament, to the espousal of the right of self-determination, and to non-aggression pacts. These innovations had led Korovine to the conclusion that form had changed with substance, and that when international law became a tool of the proletariat it was no longer even in form the same international law used before. Pashukanis, fearing apparently that a negation of the continuation of old forms would lose for the Soviet Union the protection afforded by diplomatic immunity and the exchange of representatives, as well as other privileges conferred by established international law, was loath to claim a change in form.20
The innovations introduced by the Soviet Union did not seem to him to amount to an evolution of international law, a change from bourgeois to socialist law after having passed through a transitional period.
He overlooked the philosophical meaning of a change in form, and, being without a philosophical turn of mind, he struck out against any statement defining a change. This same approach was used by him in his treatment of Soviet municipal law, which he declared to be bourgeois in form although socialist in substance.2' That error had led to his misinterpretation of the principle of the withering away of the state, and by this error he proved to Critics now point to this threat of harm by declaring that Pashukanis' line on the indentity of form and substance was an attempt to prove that Soviet legal forms were merely the successors of bourgeois legal forms. They find this approach an attempt to subordinate Soviet policy to the practice of bourgeois international law. They link it with the attempt of Trotsky and Zinoviev to bring the Soviet system down to the level of the capitalist system.
Pashukanis' theory is thought to be dangerous because it would require the U.S.S.R. to delimit its foreign policy by that order of relationships which imperialist states adopt for the purpose of consolidating the hegemony of imperialism. Theoreticians now demand recognition that the Soviet Union has developed a new form of international law, so that the Soviet Union may be free to develop its own forms and use them as it finds necessary in its struggle to prevent war. This policy has borne fruits in the pact defining aggres- In reading that unilateral application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus is not acceptable to Soviet theoreticians, an international lawyer may ask whether Pashukanis was also wrong in citing with approval acts of the French National Assembly of 1790 annulling certain Bourbon treaties.22 This principle had been used in framing the instructions given the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference of 1922 as to the argument to be used in explaining the government's refusal to honor Tsarist debts.23
In 1922 it was argued that after a class revolution conditions change to such an extent that the new class cannot be expected to pay the very debts contracted to keep the old order in the saddle in the face of revolutionary pressure from beneath. There is no reason to believe that this argument has lost its support within the Soviet Union, and the conclusion presents itself that this part of Pashukanis' theory was correct and that his error lies in failing to distinguish between the usual application of the principle and repudiation after a class revolution of obligations contracted to prevent that revolution. The very fact that German lawyers cite Pashukanis in support of their repudiation of World War obligations is taken as a measure of the danger of Pashukanis' theory, especially at a time when the Soviet struggling for strict observance of international agreements as the last barrier against world-wide war.
As a parting shot, critics suggest that they are substantiated in their claim that Pashukanis mouthed socialist phrases while espousing bourgeois ideas because of his explanation as to the source of international law. In the Encyclopedia 24 he advocated the theory propounded earlier by Professor Korovine that international law arose with exchange between tribes in preclass tribal society. This would mean that class elements need not be present in international law, and, in consequence, it would negate the basic principle of Marxism that all law has been and will continue to be class law.
Pashukanis saw this basic error himself and discarded this interpretation in the textbook,25 in which he declared that the earliest international law appeared with the earliest class society, i.e., with the development of the slaveholding state which grew out of the tribal civilization of primitive man as division of labor and acceptance of the concept of private property stratified society into classes. With this change he brought himself more nearly into keeping with Marxian theory, but his delayed correction is not helping him with his critics today, for they still decry the error of his first position.
With these criticisms in mind, the American lawyer may piece together the elements which Soviet theoreticians are now demanding in any treatment of international law. They are declared not as new elements but as principles as old as Marxism. The need for re'emphasis today arises from the fact that they had been lost sight of as theoreticians distorted and concealed them. Soviet jurists demand that the errors of the past be corrected. Most certainly of all he must make clear that the Soviet Union has developed its own forms and is not merely using bourgeois international law. This will involve explaining that the change in substance has caused form to change as well in accordance with the principles of dialectic materialism. The future theoretician must show that the Soviet Union is unfettered in its choice of forms and in its ingenuity in developing new ones, and as illustra- Throughout the whole of any future discussion, the writer must reemphasize the struggle for peace which is being waged by the U.S.S.R., and show how this struggle rests upon the sanctity of treaties and the observance of international obligations.
